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A Property Rights View: Commentary on Property 
and Speech by Robert A. Sedler 
Shelley Ross Saxer∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment protects an individual’s rights to free 
expression and religion.1 Professor Sedler analyzes the impact of this 
protection on property rights by explaining how the First Amendment 
can be used as a “sword” against property owners who seek to 
exclude free expression with claims of private ownership rights, and 
as a “shield” against government attempts to restrict individual rights 
by regulating property use.2 This dual analysis approach to property 
rights and the First Amendment illustrates how the Constitution can 
be used not only to protect individuals against government actions (as 
a “shield”), but also to allow individuals to assert their free 
expression rights to restrict the property rights of other citizens (as a 
“sword”). 
The First Amendment can be used as a “sword” when expressive 
activities conflict with real property ownership, to permit picketing, 
protests, home solicitation, and access to non-public forums. The 
First Amendment may also be used as a sword to allow activities that 
conflict with personal property ownership, such as boycotts against 
businesses and products, or to protect against liability for copyright 
infringement and antitrust violations. I begin by exploring whether 
 
 ∗ Associate Dean of Academics and Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of 
Law. I want to thank Heather Buethe and the other members of the Washington University 
Journal of Law & Policy for inviting me to participate in this outstanding Symposium. I also 
thank research assistants Siobhan Cullen, Bob Hull, and Rebecca Shult for their excellent 
research and editing assistance. 
 1. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. 
 2. See Robert A. Sedler, Property and Speech, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 123 (2006). 
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the First Amendment, as a sword, obscures the difference between 
state and private action by constitutionally preventing private 
property owners from interfering with an individual’s free expression 
rights. Thus, private property owners, who are not otherwise held to 
constitutional standards, cannot block activities of others that invade 
their property interests because these activities are protected by the 
First Amendment. 
Using the First Amendment as a “shield” is the category with 
which I am most familiar as a land use professor and scholar. Much 
of my academic writing has focused on the intersection of First 
Amendment rights and land use, and I often discuss churches and 
adult businesses in the same breath. Both religious and adult business 
land uses are protected by the First Amendment. Regulation of adult 
businesses is subject to intermediate scrutiny under the constitutional 
doctrine of “secondary effects,”3 while regulation of religious land 
uses is subject to strict scrutiny under the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).4 
This Commentary will address an additional category, not 
mentioned by Professor Sedler in his Article—the government’s use 
of eminent domain, which can be used as a “sword” against land uses 
protected by the First Amendment. For example, the government has 
used eminent domain to shut down adult businesses by condemning 
the property as blighted.5 Local government has also attempted to 
convert church property into revenue-producing property by 
condemning it and allowing private commercial development.6 
RLUIPA7 acts as a “shield” against government land use decisions 
that impact religious land uses by requiring heightened judicial 
scrutiny.8 However, adult business land uses are not similarly 
protected against eminent domain actions, and receive only 
 
 3. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
 4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000); see also infra notes 53–70 and accompanying text. 
 5. See Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain Actions Targeting First Amendment Land 
Uses, 69 MO. L. REV. 653, 658 (2004) (citing In re G. & A. Brooks, Inc., 770 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 
1985), as an example of such an adult business shutdown). 
 6. See Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redev. Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 
1214–15 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, 2000cc-1-5 (2000).  
 8. See Saxer, supra note 5, at 664. 
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intermediate scrutiny to protect the landowners’ First Amendment 
rights.9 
Professor Sedler concludes that because the First Amendment has 
been used to significantly interfere with property rights, protection of 
free expression is strong in the United States.10 Alternatively, this 
may show just how weak property rights have become, given that 
many of these decisions balance private property rights against First 
Amendment rights. Although I agree with Professor Sedler that the 
Rehnquist Court has shown a strong commitment to protecting free 
expression,11 I believe that the Court’s decisions regarding adult 
businesses and religious uses fail to adequately protect landowners’ 
property rights. Professor Sedler’s Article is extensive, and I will not 
attempt to comment on all of the territory he covers. Instead, I will 
limit my Commentary to selected areas that illustrate that the 
Rehnquist Court has reduced the protection of private property rights 
against government action, while restricting private property 
owner’s’ rights to exclude private actors who trespass or substantially 
interfere with their use and enjoyment of property interests. 
I. USING THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS A SWORD: STATE ACTION 
When the First Amendment is used as a sword, private property 
owners cannot exclude others or restrict expressive activities that 
interfere with their use and enjoyment of personal property. These 
private property rights are potentially protected by the common law 
actions of trespass, nuisance, and wrongful interference with business 
interests, as well as by statutory copyright infringement, antitrust 
liability, and other intellectual property actions.12 However, when the 
First Amendment precludes private property owners from prevailing 
on one of these actions, the owner is subjected to constitutional 
constraints in the same way that the government is restricted from 
asserting control over individuals who exercise their First 
 
 9. See id. at 658–60. 
 10. Sedler, supra note 2, at 154. 
 11. See id. at 124. 
 12. See, e.g., John R. Thomas, Liberty and Property in the Patent Law, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 
569, 599–606 (2002) (discussing cases involving the balancing of intellectual property rights 
and the First Amendment). 
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Amendment rights in conjunction with property ownership. Thus, 
private citizens are treated similarly to state actors when they attempt 
to protect their property rights against other private citizens who wish 
to exercise their First Amendment rights. 
A major Supreme Court decision involving property, Shelley v. 
Kraemer,13 blurred the distinction between private and state action to 
discourage racial discrimination in property transactions. In Shelley, 
the Court held that state judicial enforcement of racially restrictive 
private land covenants violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.14 However, although the Shelley decision 
involved property rights in the form of real covenants, the conflicting 
constitutional right was not a First Amendment claim. 
The landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,15 which 
also blurred the distinction between private and state action, was not 
a property rights decision. Instead, it involved the balancing of a 
common law claim of defamation against First Amendment rights. 
The Sullivan Court held that, in a civil lawsuit between private 
parties, the state action rule does not protect a state court judgment 
from constitutional scrutiny when a state law restricts freedoms of 
speech and press.16 The decision was limited to restricting “a State’s 
power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public 
officials against critics of their official conduct”17 absent a finding of 
actual malice; it did not extend constitutional protection to 
“defamatory statements directed against the private conduct of a 
public official or private citizen.”18  
Subsequent Supreme Court cases involving First Amendment 
conflicts with common law actions of libel and defamation continued 
to find state action where state rules of law are applied by state courts 
to restrict First Amendment freedoms.19 However, the Court has also 
 
 13. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 14. Id. at 20. 
 15. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 16. See id. at 265 (refusing to insulate an Alabama state court decision from constitutional 
review based on the state action doctrine). 
 17. Id. at 283. 
 18. Id. at 301 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 19. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991) (citing Phila. Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 
916 n.51 (1982); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964)).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/8
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noted that there is an “equally well-established line of decisions 
holding that generally applicable laws do not offend the First 
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has 
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”20 In the 
final analysis, and notwithstanding Supreme Court precedent, the 
state action doctrine remains a murky area of law, and not all courts 
apply it consistently in libel cases involving First Amendment claims 
against private actors.21 
In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,22 Justice Rehnquist 
confronted a conflict of Fifth Amendment private property rights 
against the First Amendment right of free speech. Pruneyard 
involved a private shopping mall owner’s attempt to prohibit private 
citizens from engaging in publicly expressive activities on its 
property, including the circulation of petitions, unless they related to 
the mall’s commercial purposes.23 The Court held that neither the 
private owner’s “federally recognized property rights nor their First 
Amendment rights have been infringed” by the California state court 
decision that recognized the private citizens’ expression and petition 
rights.24  
Professor Sedler emphasizes that picketing and protesting on 
adjacent public streets and sidewalks are permissible interferences 
with a private owner’s use and enjoyment of property because the 
activities take place in a public forum.25 Although Professor Sedler 
states that this First Amendment protection would be lost if the 
activities occurred on privately owned property because they would 
then be considered illegal trespasses,26 the Court in Pruneyard noted 
that while individuals who wished to exercise their free speech and 
 
 20. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669–70 (noting that the “enforcement of such general laws against 
the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other 
persons or organizations”). 
 21. See, e.g., Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1989). The 
Ninth Circuit refused to abandon what they called “the well-established state action doctrine,” 
and upheld the dismissal of civil rights claims by feminists against Hustler Magazine and Larry 
Flynt on the basis that the defendants were not state actors. Id. at 1200. 
 22. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
 23. See id. at 77. 
 24. Id. at 88. 
 25. Sedler, supra note 2, at 126–27. 
 26. Id. at 127. 
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petition rights “physically invaded” the owner’s private property, that 
was not determinative of whether they violated constitutional 
property rights.27 Instead, the Court determined that this physical 
invasion was not a “taking” of property under the Fifth Amendment 
because the property owner’s right to exclude others was not 
“essential to the use or economic value of their property.”28  
This Commentary is much too brief to explore all of the issues 
involved in evaluating the expressive rights of private citizens on 
private property. If, perhaps, the shopping mall owner in Pruneyard 
had asserted a trespass or nuisance cause of action rather than a 
“taking,” the Court may have protected his right to exclude other 
private citizens, even those wishing to express First Amendment 
rights. However, the Pruneyard landowner’s ability to assert his 
property rights may have been limited by the public’s right to 
“regulate it in the common interest.”29 The New Jersey Supreme 
Court limited a landowner’s property right to assert trespass for 
public policy reasons in State v. Shack.30 In Shack, the court held that 
entry by federal agents onto a farm owner’s property for the purpose 
of aiding a migrant farm worker was beyond the reach of the state’s 
trespass statute.31  
Professor Sedler points out that the First Amendment cannot be 
used as a sword to gain access to someone’s home for purposes of 
expression because the common law action of trespass allows the 
property owner to exclude others.32 However, the Shack court 
reduced the scope of the common law of trespass when it attempted 
to balance the rights of individuals against each other by allowing 
government workers unauthorized access to private property to 
facilitate communication with migrant farm workers.33 Moreover, in 
Pruneyard, the Supreme Court refused to find a “taking” of private 
 
 27. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 83–84. 
 28. Id. at 84. 
 29. Id. at 84–85 (“[N]either property rights nor contract rights are absolute. . . . Equally 
fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.” 
(quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934))). 
 30. 277 A.2d 369, 374–75 (N.J. 1971). 
 31. Id. at 374. 
 32. See Sedler, supra note 2, at 126–27. 
 33. Shack, 277 A.2d at 375. However, the case was not decided on First Amendment or 
other constitutional grounds. Id. at 371–72. 
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property under the Fifth Amendment, even though it allowed private 
citizens to physically invade private property to exercise their First 
Amendment rights.34 The question arises: If a private property owner 
asserts a common law action of nuisance or trespass to protect his or 
her property rights, will the invading individuals be able to trump 
these rights by asserting the First Amendment?35 If the answer is yes, 
we are requiring these private property owners to observe 
constitutional limitations against restricting their fellow private 
citizens’ free expression by limiting the effectiveness of common law 
nuisance or trespass claims. 
Picketing or protesting in front of someone’s home or business 
may substantially interfere with the property owner’s use and 
enjoyment of their property, and may be considered a common law 
nuisance.36 The judicial remedy for such an injury is either injunctive 
relief or damages. However, the Rehnquist Court cases involving 
abortion protestors, Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc.37 and 
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network,38 were not argued on a medical 
clinic’s right not to have its use and enjoyment substantially 
interfered with, but rather on whether an injunction against anti-
abortion demonstrators violated the protestors’ First Amendment 
rights.39 Consequently, lower court decisions to grant injunctive 
relief, based in whole or in part on the invasion of property rights, 
were abrogated to some extent by Madsen and Schenck because of 
 
 34. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 84. 
 35. Id. at 95 (White, J., concurring). Justice White noted that precedent cases “hold that 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not prevent the property owner from excluding those 
who would demonstrate or communicate on his property.” Id. (citing Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 
U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 557 (1972)). 
 36. See, e.g., Lucero v. Trosch, 121 F.3d 591, 599 n.12 (11th Cir. 1997) (reviewing 
district court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction against abortion protestors, and rejecting the 
argument that state nuisance laws are not applicable when First Amendment concerns are 
present); see also St. David’s Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., 921 P.2d 
821, 827 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing temporary injunction against picketing granted on 
the basis of nuisance); Kaplan v. Prolife Action League, 431 S.E.2d 828, 839–40 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1253 (1994) (discussing the balancing of nuisance activity against 
the First Amendment rights of the picketers); Hritz v. United Steel Workers of Am., No. 
CA2002-10-108, 2003 WL 22283508 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2003) (involving plaintiffs’ 
request for protection against an invasion of their privacy from protests outside their homes). 
 37. 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., majority opinion). 
 38. 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., majority opinion). 
 39. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 361; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 757. 
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First Amendment constraints.40 Those constitutional rights were 
implicated because the medical clinics’ desired remedy required state 
action. Similar to the Pruneyard situation in which private property 
owners could not exclude private citizens exercising their First 
Amendment rights, the private medical clinics could not use common 
law nuisance to protect their property rights without subjecting such 
protection to First Amendment restrictions that are generally only 
applicable to state actors.  
The government has attempted to protect property rights against 
abortion protestors by establishing a border around private medical 
clinics’ property.41 It similarly attempted to limit home solicitation to 
prevent the unwanted “trespass” of information into a private home.42 
If the government restricts expression through the regulatory process, 
such regulations should be subject to scrutiny under the First 
Amendment. However, if a court merely protects private property 
rights by granting judicial remedies under the common law actions of 
nuisance or trespass, such remedies should not be subject to First 
Amendment scrutiny, unless the state action rule in Shelley v. 
Kraemer is extended to reach more than private actions supporting a 
racially restrictive covenant.43 
When the government is the property owner seeking to exclude 
individuals from entry onto public property, its restrictions on free 
expression should also be subject to First Amendment scrutiny. 
Whether or not the government property is considered a public 
forum, it is appropriate to limit the restrictions under the First 
Amendment because the government is a state actor.44 The strictness 
 
 40. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 374–80 (striking down “floating buffer zones” imposed by 
the injunction because they burdened speech more than was necessary to serve a significant 
government interest); Madsen, 512 U.S. at 768–76 (striking down various buffer zones and a 
sign restriction on the same grounds). 
 41. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 361; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 757. 
 42. See Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. 
denied, 543 U.S. 812 (2004) (upholding the national “do not call” registry against a First 
Amendment challenge). 
 43. See Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer’s Fiftieth Anniversary: “A Time for 
Keeping; a Time for Throwing Away”?, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 61–63 (1998). 
 44. This Commentary does not attempt to describe the different judicial tests used to 
determine whether an actor is sufficiently involved with the government to make him or her a 
state actor. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor 
of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302, 303–04 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/8
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of these limitations can vary based on whether the government 
property is a public forum, but, as Professor Sedler states, “[u]nlike 
private property owners, the government does not have full control 
over its own property, and can only impose reasonable restrictions on 
access of expressive activity to a non-public forum.”45  
The fact that First Amendment rights can be used to significantly 
interfere with property rights shows how property rights protections 
have been reduced (and also illustrates Professor Sedler’s contention 
that such interference shows how strongly we protect free 
expression).46 Whenever First Amendment rights of free expression 
arise in a private property context, the courts have essentially 
converted private property owners into state actors when they have 
sought and received judicial redress.47 Private property owners’ 
actions are subject to constitutional limitations based on the First 
Amendment protection of free expression, even though they are not 
state actors. 
Noteworthy commentators, such as Professors Erwin 
Chemerinsky and Kenneth Karst, have argued that the state action 
doctrine should be eliminated, or at least limited, so that individual 
constitutional rights that protect vital liberties will be safeguarded 
against private interference.48 Chemerinsky notes that Justice 
Rehnquist took the position that constitutional rights are only 
protected against infringement by the state, not by non-governmental 
actors.49 Professor Henry Strickland has written that Chief Justice 
 
(1995); Henry C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court, 18 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 587, 592–93 (1991). 
 45. Sedler, supra note 2, at 139. 
 46. Id. at 154. 
 47. This judicial redress, even when received, is limited by the First Amendment. See, 
e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913–15 (1982) (concluding that a state 
may not impose liability for economic harm caused by desegregation boycott); Food Lion, Inc. 
v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 524 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that ABC was not liable 
for harm caused to a food market by videotape of unwholesome food practices); see also 
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (fair use defense prevents copyright holder from 
asserting property rights to exclude others from using copyrighted property). 
 48. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 556–57 
(1985); see also Harold W. Horowitz & Kenneth L. Karst, The Proposition Fourteen Cases, 14 
UCLA L. REV. 37, 45 (1966) (noting that all private infringements involve state action because 
“state action, in the form of state law, is present in all legal relationships among private 
persons”).  
 49. See Chemerinsky, supra note 48, at 520 (citing as an example Flagg Bros., Inc. v. 
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Rehnquist’s state action decisions purported to apply existing state 
action concepts, but instead reflected “a restrictive model of the state 
action doctrine that seldom treats private conduct as state action.”50 
Nevertheless, decisions during the Rehnquist Court era have at times 
reduced the sphere of private action by insisting that private 
landowners comply with the First Amendment when their property 
rights conflict with citizens’ rights to free expression on private 
property.51 
II. USING THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS A SHIELD AGAINST THE 
GOVERNMENT 
As we have seen, the Rehnquist Court has arguably given 
expansive protection to free expression when the First Amendment is 
used as a “sword” to gain access to property. However, it has done so 
at the expense of private property rights, by making private property 
owners subject to constitutional limitations as implicit state actors. 
Conversely, the Rehnquist Court has restricted the free expression of 
private property owners by allowing greater government regulation of 
unpopular, but constitutionally protected, land uses. 
As non-traditional religious groups invade local communities, 
bringing with them traffic problems, noise, and outsiders, local 
authorities apply general zoning regulations with little regard for First 
Amendment protections.52 Similarly, the growth of the sex industry 
and the proliferation of adult businesses have generated local fears 
regarding the adverse impacts of these land uses on the community. 
As local governments struggle to deal with these undesirable land 
uses and their concomitant impacts on the community, they are 
confronted with constitutional limitations on their ability to restrict 
expression. 
 
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 160 n.10 (1978)). 
 50. Strickland, supra note 44, at 645. 
 51. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. But see Dilan A. Esper, Note, Some 
Thoughts on the Puzzle of State Action, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 663, 665 (1995) (asserting that 
“[t]he “Burger and Rehnquist Courts have subsequently strengthened the doctrine”). 
 52. Shelley Ross Saxer, Zoning Away First Amendment Rights, 53 WASH. U. J. URB. & 
CONTEMP. L. 1, 8 (1998). 
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A. Religious Land Use 
Prior to the Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith,53 
religious land uses were protected under the First Amendment against 
any government action that substantially burdened the free exercise 
of religion, unless the regulation could be justified by a compelling 
government interest and it was the least restrictive means of 
achieving that interest.54 In Smith, the Rehnquist Court lessened this 
protection by holding that neutral laws of general application, even 
those that substantially burdened free exercise or impacted other First 
Amendment rights, would not be subject to strict scrutiny.55 In 
response to this reduced protection under the First Amendment, 
Congress first enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA) and then RLUIPA to restore the more protective standard 
that existed before the Smith decision.56 
RLUIPA’s constitutionality has been upheld by the Court as to its 
institutionalized persons provision,57 but it is still under constitutional 
challenge in several courts across the country.58 Nevertheless, 
religious land uses are currently protected under RLUIPA against 
 
 53. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 54. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). 
 55. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879–81 (noting that “[t]he only decisions in which we have 
held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to 
religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free 
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech 
and of the press”). 
 56. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2000). 
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that 
imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person . . . unless the 
government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person . . . (A) is in 
furtherance of a compelling government interest and (B) is the least restrictive means 
of furthering that interest. 
Id. Further, the subsection applies “even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability.” Id. § 2000cc(a)(2)(A). 
 57. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (“RLUIPA’s institutionalized-
persons provision [is] compatible with the Establishment Clause because it alleviates 
exceptional government-created burdens on private religious exercise.”). 
 58. See, e.g., Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, No. 04-55320, 2006 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 21571 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2006) (upholding the constitutionality of RLUIPA land 
use provisions). 
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government regulation that substantially burdens free exercise.59 This 
protection was provided by Congress, not by the Rehnquist Court. 
B. Adult Businesses 
Adult businesses have not fared well either under the Rehnquist 
Court, based on accepted First Amendment principles of applying 
strict scrutiny to content-based regulation. Beginning with the 
Court’s decision in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,60 
sexually-oriented businesses have received lesser protection from 
content-based regulation than have other First Amendment protected 
activities.61 In American Mini Theatres, Justice Rehnquist joined 
Justice Stevens’ majority opinion to hold that zoning ordinances that 
classified motion picture theaters on the basis of whether or not they 
exhibited adult movies were constitutional, even though based on the 
content of expression, traditionally protected by the First 
Amendment.62 Normally, whenever the government regulates 
expression based on its content, such regulation is subject to strict 
scrutiny.63 However, regulations regarding adult businesses have only 
been subject to intermediate scrutiny, even when they are regulated 
based on the content of their protected expression. 
In the first year of the Rehnquist Court, but before his 
appointment to Chief Justice, Justice Rehnquist authored the majority 
opinion in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,64 which 
established the “secondary effects doctrine.”65 This doctrine allowed 
 
 59. See, e.g., Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1239–43 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (holding RLUIPA to be constitutional under Section Four of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Establishment Clause, and the Tenth Amendment). 
 60. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
 61. See id. at 63 n.18 (analyzing the content-based regulation necessary to further a 
significant government interest as a time, place and manner regulation); id. at 70 (“[E]ven 
though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic 
materials . . . it is manifest that society’s interest in protecting this type of expression is of a 
wholly different, and lesser, magnitude.”). 
 62. See id. at 71–72.  
 63. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 574 (2001) (noting that the 
Court has “consistently applied strict scrutiny to . . . content-based regulations of speech”). 
 64. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
 65. “[Z]oning ordinances designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects of [adult] 
businesses are to be reviewed under the standards applicable to ‘content neutral’ time, place, 
and manner regulations.” Id. at 49. Such secondary effects include crime, depreciating property 
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the Court to apply intermediate scrutiny to content-based regulations 
of sexually-oriented businesses, as though they were content-neutral 
time, place, and manner regulations.66 This doctrine has continued to 
allow local authorities “to impair the economic viability of the 
sexually-oriented businesses in the hope that they will close down,”67 
even though, as Professor Sedler notes, “the First Amendment 
protects the message of erotica conveyed by sexually-oriented 
entertainment.”68 Although it is possible that the secondary effects 
doctrine may not remain viable in the future,69 for now it allows the 
regulation of sexually-oriented entertainment, so long as there are 
adverse secondary effects from the business and ample alternative 
avenues of communication available.70 
Professor Sedler also discusses the licensing of sexually-oriented 
businesses and the standards for such regulation under the prior 
restraint doctrine.71 In FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,72 the 
Rehnquist Court invalidated a Dallas licensing scheme that used 
zoning restrictions to regulate sexually-oriented businesses, declaring 
the scheme an unconstitutional prior restraint on First Amendment 
speech.73 Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion established that a 
licensing law must not allow unbridled discretion in the hands of a 
government official, such that a license might be denied on the 
grounds of censorship.74 In addition, there must be a time limit on the 
license decision-making process to prevent unreasonable delays that 
result in censorship.75 Professor Sedler concludes that “the First 
 
values, and a decline in the quality of urban life. Id. at 48. 
 66. See id. at 46–50. “‘[C]ontent-neutral’ time, place, and manner regulations are 
acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a substantial government interest and do not 
unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.” Id. at 47. 
 67. Sedler, supra note 2, at 142 n.79. 
 68. Id. at 141. 
 69. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (noting that the secondary effects doctrine is a fiction that is “perhaps more 
confusing than helpful,” and has not “commanded our consistent adherence”). 
 70. See id. at 434 (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–50). 
 71. See Sedler, supra note 2, at 142–44. 
 72. 493 U.S. 215 (1990). 
 73. Id. at 229. 
 74. Id. at 225–30. 
 75. Id.; see also Scott D. Bergthold, Effective Licensing of Sexually Oriented Businesses, 
in PROTECTING FREE SPEECH AND EXPRESSION: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND LAND USE LAW 
61 (Daniel R. Mandelker & Rebecca L. Rubin eds., 2001). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p155 Saxer book pages.doc  11/1/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
168 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 21:155 
 
 
Amendment provides a high degree of protection to those engaged in 
the business of expression when the state requires that they obtain a 
license to do so.”76 I agree with this conclusion, but I also argue that 
the prior restraint doctrine should be applied instead of the secondary 
effects doctrine to give this high degree of protection to First 
Amendment land uses when government discretion in regulation is 
involved.77 Thus, when zoning regulations require conditional use or 
special use permits, they operate as a licensing system and should be 
analyzed under the prior restraint doctrine, rather than the secondary 
effects doctrine that treats even content-based government regulation 
in this context as content-neutral. 
III. EMINENT DOMAIN–THE GOVERNMENT’S SWORD 
The final comment I would add to Professor Sedler’s piece 
regards the use of eminent domain as the government’s sword against 
First Amendment rights. For example, if the government desires to 
close an adult entertainment business, it can indirectly do so by 
condemning the real property interest for the asserted purpose of 
eliminating community blight or increasing the city’s revenue base.78 
In this way, the government can eliminate the undesirable use 
without being subject to strict scrutiny, even though it indirectly 
targets free expression. Instead, in these situations courts have 
applied intermediate scrutiny as articulated in United States v. 
O’Brien,79 which requires that:  
(1) the action is within the constitutional power of the 
government; (2) the action furthers important or substantial 
government interests; (3) the interests furthered are unrelated 
to the suppression of free speech; and (4) the restriction on 
 
 76. Sedler, supra note 2, at 144. 
 77. See Saxer, supra note 52, at 33–37. 
 78. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665–66 (2005) (holding that the 
“public purposes” that allow a city‘s eminent domain condemnation included a city’s desire for 
“economic development,” even if accomplished by private interests). 
 79. 391 U.S. 367, 378–80 (1968). 
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First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of the government interests.80 
Even when there is evidence that the government is using its 
eminent domain power to suppress undesirable but protected 
expression, courts have still applied intermediate scrutiny and upheld 
condemnation actions when other legitimate purposes, such as 
eliminating blight or increasing the tax base, justify the use of this 
power.81 Thus, private property interests are not sufficiently protected 
against the government’s use of its eminent domain power as a sword 
against property used for protected expression. The government can 
suppress protected adult entertainment expression by using eminent 
domain, so long as there is also a legitimate public purpose unrelated 
to this suppression.82 
Similarly, local officials have targeted religious land uses to 
redevelop church-owned property for commercial use, which would 
bring additional tax revenue not available from a religious non-profit 
use.83 Because RLUIPA applies strict scrutiny review when a land 
use regulation substantially burdens religious exercise, eminent 
domain actions that target religious uses require the government to 
show that it has a compelling interest in taking such action and that 
doing so is the least restrictive means of achieving the asserted 
interest.84 Consequently, the enactment of RLUIPA assures that 
 
 80. In re G. & A. Books, Inc., 770 F.2d 288, 296 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying the four-part 
test from United States v. O’Brien to a New York rehabilitation program for Times Square that 
proposed to condemn buildings containing adult retail stores). 
 81. Id. at 297 (finding that subjective motivation to suppress speech did not make the 
action unconstitutional because “important governmental interests unrelated to suppression of 
speech exist, independent of any desire to suppress speech”); see also Forty-Second St. Co. v. 
Koch, 613 F. Supp. 1416, 1420 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (upholding an eminent domain action against 
claims by the property owners that their theaters were “being singled out for condemnation 
because defendants object to the content of the movies they exhibit, which include low-budget 
martial arts and horror movies along with some mainstream Hollywood fare and sexually 
explicit films”); In re Condemnation by Urban Redev. Auth., 823 A.2d 1086, 1095 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2003) (affirming a lower court ruling that hostile comments by city officials about 
the adult theater being condemned were not sufficient to justify applying strict scrutiny to a 
project addressing other primary public purposes). 
 82. See Saxer, supra note 5, at 660–61. 
 83. See, e.g., Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redev. Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 
1225 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 84. See id. at 1228–29 (determining that the City’s interests in generating revenue and 
eliminating blight were not sufficiently compelling to justify the resulting burden on religious 
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religious uses will receive greater protection from targeted 
condemnation actions by local government than sexually-oriented 
expression. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Sedler’s article provides an exhaustive coverage of the 
First Amendment and its impact on property rights. As always, his 
work demonstrates the practical aspects of these legal principles as he 
seeks to advance the goal of applying academic scholarship to 
litigation practice. The Rehnquist Court sharpened the edge of the 
First Amendment “sword,” as it has allowed private citizens to gain 
access to private property for free expression purposes, despite 
countervailing property rights.85 Undeniably, this demonstrates the 
high degree of protection afforded to freedom of expression by the 
American constitutional system, but it also shows how property rights 
have received diminished protection, even from a Court that is 
deemed to have been protective of private property rights.86 By 
effectively treating private property owners as state actors when they 
request judicial relief against those seeking expressive access to their 
properties, the Court has subjected them to First Amendment 
limitations and restricted their ability to exclude or prevent activities 
harmful to their property interests. 
Property owners’ First Amendment “shield” against the 
government has also been dented by the Rehnquist Court’s Smith 
 
exercise created by the City’s use of its eminent domain power). 
 85. See, e.g., supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
 86. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Rehnquist Revolution, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 27, 2004, 
available at http://www.powells.com/review/2005_01_06.html (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, A 
COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005)) 
(“Since joining the Court as associate justice in 1971, Rehnquist has had a clear agenda for 
constitutional interpretation … to increase the protection of private property. . . . The Rehnquist 
Court has not always acted in accordance with the views of William Rehnquist, but it has 
moved dramatically in his preferred directions.”); see also James Salzman, Earth in the Judicial 
Balance, THE NATION, Oct. 9, 2000, available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/ 
20001009/salzman (“The Rehnquist Court has applied the takings clause aggressively and 
shifted the balance toward greater compensation for property owners. . . . The net result has 
been expanded protections for private property owners and cost constraints on legislatures 
seeking to protect public resources.”).  
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decision and its secondary effects doctrine.87 However, although the 
Smith decision reduced religious exercise protection when neutral 
laws of general application impact religious land uses, these uses are 
now protected by federal and state legislation such as RLUIPA, 
which subjects government regulation that burdens religious exercise 
to strict scrutiny.88 While the legislature has protected religious land 
uses, adult businesses have not fared as well and are often subject to 
content-based regulation under the secondary effects doctrine. This 
doctrine, which treats content-based regulation of adult businesses as 
content-neutral because of the adverse impact of these businesses on 
the community, subjects adult business land uses only to intermediate 
scrutiny, not to the strict scrutiny typically required for the content-
based regulations of protected free expression. 
Finally, Professor Sedler did not discuss eminent domain as a 
government “sword” against First Amendment land uses. Eminent 
domain is a powerful government tool that can be used to target 
undesirable uses, such as adult businesses or churches, to eliminate 
blight or increase the tax revenue base. After the Court’s decision in 
Kelo v. City of New London,89 municipalities only need to show some 
public purpose, including private development, to condemn property 
otherwise protected by the First Amendment. Although RLUIPA may 
act as an effective legislative protection when eminent domain is used 
against a religious land use, adult businesses will, at most, receive 
intermediate scrutiny protection against such condemnations. 
The Rehnquist Court has reduced private property rights by giving 
private citizens access to private property for expressive activity, 
even though the state action doctrine should not normally subject 
private property owners to constitutional limitations. The Court has 
also reduced the protection of First Amendment land uses by 
subjecting neutral laws of general application to rational basis 
scrutiny, even if such laws burden religious exercise, and by 
subjecting content-based regulation of adult uses to intermediate 
scrutiny only under the secondary effects doctrine. The eminent 
domain sword continues to allow the government to target First 
 
 87. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
 88. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000). 
 89. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
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Amendment land uses to control undesirable land uses. Private 
property rights have suffered when balanced against the expressive 
rights of other private citizens and against the government’s desire to 
regulate protected First Amendment land uses. 
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